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A Normative Pragmatic Theory of Exhorting 
 
Abstract: We submit a normative pragmatic theory of exhorting—an account of conceptually necessary and 
potentially efficacious components of a coherent strategy for securing a sympathetic hearing for efforts to urge and 
inspire addressees to act on high-minded principles. Based on a Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning, we argue 
that the concept of exhorting comprises making statements openly urging addressees to perform some high-minded, 
principled course of action; openly intending to inspire addressees to act on the principles; and intending that 
addressees’ recognition of the intentions to urge and inspire creates reasons for addressees to grant a sympathetic 
hearing to what the speaker has to say. We show that the theory accounts for the design of Abraham Lincoln’s 
Cooper Union address. By doing so we add to the inventory of reasons why social actors make arguments, continue 
a line of research showing the relationship of arguing to master speech acts, and show that making arguments can be 
an effective strategy for inspiring principled action. 
 




Exhorting—urging and inspiring addressees to act on high-minded principles, duties, commitments, and the 
like—is widespread, occurring for example in sermons, interpersonal relationships, staff meetings, and civic 
discourse. Social actors occasionally encounter challenges and problems demanding extraordinary, unwelcome 
exertion, and need another social actor to urge and inspire them to live up to and fulfill obligations imposed on them 
by their fundamental commitments (Krause 2002, 11-12, 108-109). The capacity of exhortation to bring reason-
giving discourse to bear on urging and inspiring principled action renders this speech act deserving of attention from 
students of argumentation. 
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In rhetorical studies, Edwin Black has outlined a foundational account of exhorting: “the evocation of an 
emotional response in the audience induces belief in the situation to which the emotion is appropriate. In this genre, 
a strong emotional experience does not follow the acceptance of a belief, or accompany it; it precedes it. Emotion 
can be said to produce the belief, instead of the reverse” (1965, 138). One scholar has recently argued that Black did 
not go far enough—that speakers can effectively exhort even without generating “a formal belief” due to a 
neuropsychological mechanism of “emotional contagion,” or “the auditor unconsciously begin[ning] to embody and 
likewise internalize the orator’s emotional state” (Marinelli 2016, 471). Both accounts feature audiences’ emotions, 
but on face a message designed to induce a wholly emotional or neurophysiological experience may be easily 
dismissed as manipulative, especially by addressees disinclined to disturb their cognitive equilibrium with attention 
to an exhorter’s urgings. How can a speaker design an exhortation that influences even reluctant addressees to grant 
a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say, and why can she expect it to work? 
We answer this question by providing a normative pragmatic account of exhorting (e.g., van Eemeren et al. 
2014, 454-459; Goodwin 2011; Innocenti and Kathol 2018; Jacobs 2000; Kauffeld 1998; Kauffeld 2009a; Kauffeld 
2009b; Pinto 2007). After outlining basic normative pragmatic theory, we first argue that exhorting comprises 
making statements openly urging addressees to perform some principled course of action; openly intending to 
inspire addressees to act on the principles; and intending that addressees’ recognition of the intentions to urge and 
inspire creates reasons to grant a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say. We then show that the theory 
explains the design of Abraham Lincoln’s Cooper Union address. By describing the normative structure of 
exhorting, we add to the inventory of reasons why social actors make arguments—e.g., rationally resolving 
differences of opinion, justifying belief or action, displaying identity, expanding an agenda, and more (Asen 2005; 
Hample and Irions 2015). In addition, we continue a line of research showing the relationship of making arguments 
to master speech acts such as proposing and accusing (Jacobs 1989; Innocenti and Kathol 2018; Kauffeld 1998).1 
Further, our analysis of Lincoln’s exhortation follows historical and contemporary rhetorical theorizing (Conley 
1984) showing that making arguments may be analyzed as a strategic maneuver (van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2000) 
designed to inspire principled action. 
 
2 Normative pragmatic theory 
                                                        
1 We use the phrase “making arguments” and related terms such as “argumentation” in the sense of O’Keefe’s 
(1982) “argument1-making.” 
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Normative pragmatic theory explains why speakers can reasonably expect their messages to secure 
intended responses from addressees—e.g., to consider a proposal (Kauffeld 1998), to defer to an expert (Goodwin 
2011), to accede to demands (Innocenti and Kathol 2018). The accounts are based on, first, norms brought to bear by 
making utterances intended to secure responses from addressees and, second, practical reasoning underlying those 
utterances.2 Normative pragmatic theory is based on a Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning, or what it means to 
seriously say and mean something. In what follows we first outline a Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning and 
then the underlying practical calculation that explains why a speaker can reasonably expect making utterances to 
secure intended responses from addressees. 
2.1 Gricean analysis of utterance-meaning 
 We describe the analysis of utterance-meaning that follows as Gricean because it is based primarily on 
Grice’s work in the philosophy of language but also on the work of others who added important components to 
Grice’s analysis. The basic question Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning addressed was, What does it mean to 
seriously say and mean something? Grice (1957; 1969; Strawson 1964) answered the question in terms of reflexive 
speaker intentions, and Stampe (1967) explained Grice’s insight that addressees’ recognition of the speaker’s 
intentions provides some reason for them to respond as the speaker intends. In what follows we sketch the analysis 
in order to illustrate the basic philosophical grounding of normative pragmatic theory outlined in the following 
subsection.3 
Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning in his foundational essays “Meaning” (1957) and “Utterer’s Meaning 
and Intention” (1969) is based on a fundamental insight that some utterance-meaning can be accounted for in terms 
of speaker intention. Over time Grice’s analysis became increasingly complex as he addressed objections and 
counter-examples. We sketch the version comprising modifications he made in 1969 in to his initial 1957 analysis in 
                                                        
2 Researchers who approach argumentation from a pragma-dialectical perspective have also described their 
theorizing as normative pragmatic and also make use of speech act theory in developing pragma-dialectical theory 
(e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Jackson, and Jacobs 1993). Whereas pragma-dialectical theory is based on integrating Grice’s maxims with Searle’s 
conditions for the performance of speech acts (e.g., Andone 2013; Houtlosser 1998; Snoeck Henkemans 2014), 
normative pragmatic theory is based on Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning (1957; 1969) as amended and 
explained by Strawson (1964) and Stampe (1967). Normative pragmatic theory explains why a speaker can 
reasonably expect her utterance to secure her intended response from addressees without recourse to a notion of 
rules applied to a communicative interaction (Kauffeld 1987; Kauffeld 2009b; Strawson 1964). Instead, a normative 
pragmatic account explains or makes intelligible how social actors themselves design messages that regulate the 
activity (e.g., Jacobs 1989; 2000; 2006). 
3 See Kauffeld 1987; 2001; 2009a; 2009b for more detail on Grice’s analysis. 
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response to Strawson (1964) because this version and discussion of it by Stampe (1967) philosophically ground 
normative pragmatic theory.  
In Grice’s analysis, a speaker means something by uttering u if and only if for some addressees she utters u 
with the following reflexive intentions (Grice 1957, 383-385; Grice 1969, 151, 156; Strawson 1964, 447; Stampe 
1967, 31-32): 
The speaker intends1 (or at least acts as if she intends1) that addressees respond that p; 
The speaker intends2 (or at least acts as if she intends2) that addressees recognize the speaker’s intention1; 
The speaker intends3 (or at least acts as if she intends3) that addressees recognize the speaker’s intention2; 
The speaker intends4 (or at least acts as if she intends4) that addressees’ recognition of the speaker’s 
intentions provides addressees with some reason for responding that p. 
Put differently, a speaker who seriously says and means something—who utters something with the intention1 that 
addressees respond in a particular way—also intends2 that addressees recognize her intention1, and intends3 that 
addressees recognize that she intends2 them to recognize her intention1. Further, the speaker intends4 that addressees’ 
recognition of these intentions provides some reason for addressees to respond as the speaker intends1. 
 Grice’s analysis accounts for utterance-meaning in terms of reflexive speaker intentions rather than 
convention (Stampe 1967; Stampe 1975; Strawson 1964). As Jacobs (1989, 361) has noted about a “conventionalist 
understanding,” “Speech acts have the force that they do and are constituted by the conditions that they have 
because that is how the game is played. There is no deeper rationale or functional design.” But by accounting for 
utterance-meaning in terms of intention, Grice orients students of argumentation toward deeper rationales for actual 
message design or, in other words, ethical, moral, and pragmatic explanations why communication strategies may 
reasonably be expected to secure intended responses. The centerpiece of Grice’s analysis is the accountability 
generated by intention3. By deliberately, openly intending her utterances to secure a particular response from 
addressees, a speaker makes herself accountable for obligations and responsibilities she undertakes just by making 
the utterance. In this analysis undertaking and discharging obligations, responsibilities, and the like explains why a 
speaker can reasonably expect her utterances to secure some predictable response. The following subsection 
explains that point in more detail. 
 
2.2 Basic normative pragmatic theory 
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 In what sense does recognition of reflexive speaker intentions provide some reason for addressees to 
respond in accord with the speaker’s primary intention? First, Stampe (1967) follows Peirce in noting that even the 
basic communicative act of asserting with the intent of securing addressees' belief involves the speaker assuming 
responsibility for the veracity of the utterance, a feature of utterance-meaning that accounts for reactive attitudes 
toward lying, misleading, deceiving, and the like. So if a speaker successfully manifests the intention2 that 
addressees recognize her intent1 to influence them to believe her utterance, then addressees recognize the speaker 
undertaking responsibility for the veracity of her assertion and her willingness to risk addressees’ resentment if it 
turns out she is lying, misleading, and the like. So, second, a speaker who gets addressees to recognize her intent2 
gives addressees some reason—namely, that she would not risk their resentment unless she had met the 
responsibility that she undertook just by asserting—to respond by believing the assertion as the speakers intends1. In 
short, a speaker also intends3 addressees to recognize her intent2 in order to secure the response she intends1. This 
practical calculation explains the sense in which a speaker’s intent4 that addressees recognize her intentions provides 
some reason for addressees to respond as the speaker intends1. Thus, a Gricean account of utterance-meaning 
provides an account of illocutionary force not in terms of following conventions but in pragmatic terms (Jacobs 
1989; Kauffeld 1987; Kauffeld 2009b; Stampe 1975; Strawson 1964). 
 The sorts of reasons created just by seriously saying and meaning some utterance may be described as 
presumptions, where presumptions are inferences taken by reason of the risk of resentment (Kauffeld 1995; 
Kauffeld 1998; Kauffeld 2003; Moldovan 2016). Examples include a presumption of veracity (addressees presume a 
speaker would not risk resentment for lying unless she had made a responsible effort to ascertain the truth of her 
assertion), a presumption of fairness (addressees presume a speaker would not risk resentment for impugning 
somebody’s character unless she had made a responsible effort to treat the person fairly), and a presumption of merit 
(addressees presume a speaker would not risk resentment for wasting their time unless she had made responsible 
efforts to say something meriting addressees’ time and attention). 
Because making an utterance involves the speaker deliberately and openly manifesting her intention to get 
addressees to respond and incurring responsibilities, making the utterance changes the context or “normative terrain” 
(Goodwin 2011, 291) such that addressees incur reciprocal responsibilities. Analogously, as setting up a line divider 
obligates theater personnel to act in accord with norms of queuing, so it obligates patrons to act in accord with them 
as well (Innocenti and Miller 2016). Consider the basic act of asserting with an intent to secure addressees’ belief. 
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The presumption of veracity is grounded in a norm that speakers ought to speak truthfully and not lie, deceive, 
mislead, and the like. The norm is reciprocal; as speakers ought to speak truthfully, so addressees ought not to be 
unduly skeptical, lie, mislead, willfully ignorant, and the like. So to avoid criticism for undue skepticism, lying, and 
so on, addressees can respond as the speaker intends, i.e, by believing the assertion. 
Of course in many cases, securing belief or other intended responses is not that simple. The reasons created 
just by making a basic utterance may not be sufficient for securing the intended response. Addressees may choose to 
accept risks of criticism for not responding as the speaker intends, perhaps by arguing that some norm does not 
apply to them or is not relevant in the circumstances. For example, even though any serious assertion generates a 
presumption of veracity, addressees may calculate that any risk of criticism for undue skepticism is mitigated by 
evidence they have found that is contrary to the speaker’s assertion. Consider a case where a speaker asserts, “One 
and a half million people attended the presidential inauguration. Anyone who says fewer attended is a liar! Fake 
news!” The speaker deliberately and openly intends that addressees believe the assertion, vividly engages a 
presumption of veracity, and thereby changes the context such that addressees incur a reciprocal responsibility to not 
be unduly skeptical, willfully ignorant, and the like. But addressees may choose to take that risk; they may not 
respond with belief as the speaker intends. They may have strong grounds for skepticism so calculate that the 
potential risk of criticism for undue skepticism or willful ignorance is low. In fact, they may proffer grounds to 
support their skepticism. In doing so, they engage the presumption of veracity and change the normative terrain such 
that the first speaker must provide grounds or risk resentment for lying, willful ignorance, and the like. 
In short, normative pragmatic theories explain why a speaker can reasonably expect just her utterance to 
secure her intended response from addressees in pragmatic terms of manifest speaker intentions and presumptive 
inferences underlying those intentions. Just by making utterances deliberately and openly, a speaker creates two 
reasons for addressees to respond as she intends. First, addressees can reason that the speaker would not 
deliberately, openly incur responsibility for living up to some norm unless she planned to meet it. Second, 
addressees can reason that they can avoid criticism for not living up to a reciprocal norm by responding as the 
speaker intends. 
 
3 Normative pragmatic theory of exhorting 
3.1 Conceptual analysis of exhorting 
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We submit that exhorting comprises three necessary components: making statements openly urging 
addressees to perform some principled action; manifestly intending to inspire addressees to act on their duty, 
commitment, obligation, and the like; and speaking with the intention that addressees’ recognition of the speaker’s 
open intention to urge addressees to act and overt effort to inspire addressees’ performance creates reasons for 
granting a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say. In this subsection we make a case for this normative 
structure and in the next subsection explain the underlying pragmatics. 
The first necessary component of exhorting is making an utterance urging addressees to perform some 
principled action. We would regard it as odd were a speaker to say, “I exhort you to go to the polls and vote today, 
but I am not saying that you ought to vote.” Moreover, to exhort, the speaker must come out and say that addressees 
are to perform the principled action. One may implicate things by exhorting, but one cannot exhort by merely 
implicating. Someone who said, “Perhaps you should vote,” “It could be that you are to vote,” and the like could 
hardly be described as exhorting addressees to vote.  
However, exhorting requires more than urging addressees to perform some principled action. A speaker 
might say, “It is clear you are to vote; but whether you actually vote is up to you,” but it would be odd to describe 
just that utterance as exhorting rather than, say, advising. Just an utterance stating that addressees are to perform 
some principled action could also be a command or some other imperative. A second necessary component is a 
manifest intention to inspire addressees to act on the principle or, put differently, an open intention of drawing forth, 
eliciting, or arousing an intentional/affective orientation corresponding to the call to action. An utterance like “I 
exhort you to stand firm, but I am not trying to get you to muster the courage to do it” is incoherent. 
Intentional/affective orientations include alert, resolved, vigorous, energetic, cautious, courageous, compassionate, 
strenuous, and more. For example, a speaker might exhort addressees to resolutely pursue a graduate degree or 
cautiously approach driving in a snowstorm. These intentional/affective orientations admit various degrees. A 
speaker may exhort addressees to undertake graduate study resolved to see it through, but may also exhort 
addressees to undertake that course firmly resolved to complete it. Likewise, a speaker may exhort addressees to 
drive in snow cautiously, or to be extremely cautious. The fact that these intentional/affective orientations may vary 
in degree opens the possibility that, with respect to each, one may be inspired. Inspiration may be a complicated and 
in some respects mysterious matter, but it always involves some kind of heightening or elevation. Thus what a 
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speaker says and how may be designed to inspire addressees to produce a highly energetic and/or vigorous 
performance. 
The third necessary component of exhorting is that the exhorter speaks with the intention that addressees’ 
recognition of the speaker’s open intentions to urge and inspire addressees to perform some principled action creates 
reasons for addressees to grant a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say. As proposers may aim to secure 
tentative consideration of a proposal more so than immediate adoption (Kauffeld 1998), or indeed speakers 
generally may aim to secure some sort of intermediate response before acting such as wondering, considering, 
weighing evidence, and the like (Pinto 1991), so exhorters may aim to secure a response intermediate to action, 
namely a sympathetic hearing. An audience can grant a sympathetic hearing but is not therefore committed to acting. 
What is a “sympathetic hearing”? Following recent work in moral philosophy and political theory on Adam 
Smith’s account of sympathy (e.g., Darwall 2013; Frazer 2010), we use the expression “sympathetic hearing” in the 
sense of speaker and addressees sharing a warranted harmony of feeling in reacting to a situation. Sympathetic 
addressees do not merely hear and understand what a speaker says while recognizing the feelings animating the 
speaker’s utterances. Sympathetic addressees’ apprehension of what the speaker says shifts from this relatively 
objective orientation and takes on something like what Strawson (1974) has called a reactive attitude. A reactive 
attitude is not emotional contagion; instead, addressees apprehend what the speaker says while experiencing 
something of the feelings animating the speaker’s utterance. Externalizing a sympathetic hearing may involve 
addressees saying they see the speaker feels angry (or some other moral sentiment) about the situation and they 
appreciate and indeed share her anger. 
The intention to create reasons for granting a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say is 
conceptually necessary for distinguishing exhorting from mere haranguing. Both exhorting and haranguing may 
issue from the speaker supposing addressees are not living up to their proper commitments and duties, and both may 
voice disapprobation of the relevant failings. But the harangue is essentially an angry diatribe (tirade, rant) that is 
largely indifferent to soliciting a favorable reception from addressees. Indeed, in some cases a negative or hostile 
response could be interpreted by the speaker as evidence that she is on the side of truth and right (Jacobs 1983; van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jacobs, and Jackson 1993, ch. 7). An exhorter, in contrast, cannot coherently express 
indifference about addressees’ reception of her urging. We would find it odd were a speaker to say, “I do not care 
whether you turn a deaf ear on what I have to say; I exhort you to do your very best in this afternoon’s contest.” 
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What exactly are the reasons created by deliberately, openly urging and attempting to inspire addressees to 
perform some principled action? The answer involves describing the pragmatics of exhorting. Before turning to that 
task, we note the adequacy of our conceptual account. If a speaker acknowledges she is openly attempting to elicit a 
sympathetic hearing for utterances manifestly designed to urge and inspire addressees to perform a principled action, 
we would regard as odd a denial on her part that she is exhorting addressees to adopt that course of action. We might 
well accept such a denial from a speaker who is covertly trying to urge and inspire addressees to execute a course of 
action, but where a speaker openly speaks with such intentions, she is transparently attempting to exhort addressees. 
 
3.2 Pragmatics of exhorting 
The presumptions engaged just by exhorting serve as reasons for granting a sympathetic hearing. Speakers 
engage presumptions by undertaking and discharging obligations. What obligations do exhorters undertake and what 
presumptions do they engage? 
Fundamentally, an exhorter undertakes an obligation to speak truthfully. Utterances that are not truthful 
lack persuasive force because addressees can easily dismiss them as lies. Undertaking an obligation to speak 
truthfully generates a presumption of veracity: the speaker would not risk criticism for lying or ignorance unless she 
had made responsible efforts to ascertain the veracity of her utterances. But just that presumption of veracity is 
characteristically not sufficient for securing a sympathetic hearing in circumstances where addressees are reluctant 
to act on some principles or duties. What other obligations do exhorters undertake just by exhorting, and what 
presumptions do they engage? 
First, making utterances urging addressees to perform some principled action obligates a speaker to have 
made responsible efforts to ascertain the urgency of performing it, where urgency may involve immediate, pressing, 
or imperative need. If addressees ask the speaker to explain why they ought to perform some principled action, the 
speaker is obligated to provide reasons why they ought to act. An exhorter cannot coherently refuse to do so; for 
example, she cannot coherently say, “I exhort you to stand firm, but I can’t tell you why you should,” or “I exhort 
you to stand firm, and I have a good reason why you should, but it is not urgent.” So exhorting engages a 
presumption that the speaker would not risk criticism for wasting addressees’ time, poor judgment, questionable 
morality, and the like unless she had made responsible efforts to ascertain what moral course of action ought to be 
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performed in the situation. Other things being equal, if the speaker’s take on the urgent need for principled action 
seems mistaken, morally questionable, and the like, addressees can dismiss her exhortation with impunity.4  
A potentially efficacious strategy for securing a sympathetic hearing, then, involves delineating a situation 
indicating the urgency of performing some principled action. Other things being equal, the more accurately, vividly, 
and the like the exhorter delineates the scene, the more she makes herself accountable to addressees for her moral 
bearing and therefore the more reason she creates for addressees to at least grant her exhortation a sympathetic 
hearing. At the same time, addressees cannot fail to recognize what the speaker sees or fail to share the speaker’s 
feelings about the situation without risking criticism for questionable morality, short-sightedness, and the like. To 
avoid risks of criticism, they can grant a sympathetic hearing to what the speaker has to say. 
Another obligation exhorters undertake is connected to their overt efforts to inspire addressees to act—to 
arouse an intentional/affective orientation corresponding to the call to action. Those efforts obligate an exhorter to 
have carefully considered both the situation calling for action and addressees’ circumstances, specifically constraints 
inhibiting their performance of the action, because she is making a claim on how addressees ought to orient toward 
acting. An exhorter cannot coherently say, “I exhort you to go to the polls and vote, and I see that it is not possible 
for you to get to the polls.” Attempts to inspire may fall flat if exhorters fail to show they recognize and appreciate 
the difficulties of addressees’ circumstances. So exhorting engages a presumption that the speaker would not risk 
criticism for self-righteousness, pretention, fanaticism, and the like unless she had made responsible efforts to 
understand and appreciate addressees’ difficulties in performing some principled action. Other things being equal, 
addressees can dismiss with impunity an exhortation that misses the mark in efforts to inspire, perhaps saying the 
speaker is out of touch with their reality, has alienated them, is insufferable, smug, and so on. 
A potentially efficacious strategy for securing a sympathetic hearing, then, involves delineating a situation 
indicating the propriety of the intentional/affective orientation toward the principled action. The greater the 
difficulties and constraints faced by addressees, the greater the efforts necessary to inspire them to act, so the greater 
                                                        
4 We maintain that exhortations must urge and inspire principled action, a position compatible with the fact that 
news sources have described as exhortation some of U.S. President Donald Trump’s calls to deplorable action 
(Hoefler 2016; Sweeny 2017). We believe utterances such as a call to “get ‘em” (protestors) at one of his March 
2016 presidential campaign rallies are more accurately described as “inciting violence” than “exhorting violence,” as 
indicated by both public outrage at Trump’s calls to violent action and questions about whether Trump “incited” 
violence. Nonetheless, even if one wants to describe calls to deplorable action as exhortation, we submit that such 
exhortations may not be practically efficacious because they are easy to dismiss with impunity as immoral, 
unethical, wrong, not the right thing to do, and so on (see also Cooper and Zeleny 2011). As arguments can be weak 
or poor, so can exhortations. 
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the risks of criticism undertaken by the exhorter for foolish pretension, insufferable self-righteousness, fanaticism, 
and the like, so the more reason she creates for addressees to grant her exhortation a sympathetic hearing. At the 
same time, addressees cannot fail to recognize and partake of the speaker’s intentional/affective orientation without 
risking criticism for moral apathy, lack of courage, weak will, or some other relevant moral, ethical shortcoming 
because the speaker’s strategies make visible and therefore make addressees accountable for recognizing the 
propriety of the intentional/affective orientation. To avoid that criticism, they can grant a sympathetic hearing to the 
speaker’s exhortation—can recognize and partake in the moral sentiments displayed by the speaker. 
Of course to avoid risks a speaker creates just by exhorting, addressees need not necessarily grant a 
sympathetic hearing. They can respond with a message designed to show, say, a lack of urgency to act or a need to 
perform a different, more principled action. They can respond with further information about their own 
circumstances and constraints inhibiting some principled action. Consequently, it is in the speaker’s interest to 
design a message that forestalls the possibility of addressees’ easy dismissal of the exhortation. This circumstance 
accounts for why speakers who exhort characteristically say more than “Act!” In fact, this helps to account for why 
a speaker exhorts at all when doing so puts her at risk of criticism for questionable morality, fanaticism, and more. 
She must exhort in order to make it risky for addressees to not act on some principle because, other things being 
equal, in the absence of exhortation, addressees can say with impunity that they did not see an urgent need to rouse 
themselves to perform some principled act.  
In short, presumptions engaged just by exhorting—just by making utterances deliberately, openly designed 
to urge and inspire performance of some principled action—are reasons for granting a sympathetic hearing. 
Exhorting licenses addressees to presume the exhorter would not risk criticism for questionable morality or foolish 
pretension unless she had made responsible efforts to ascertain what principled action was called for and what 
constraints inhibited addressees’ performance. Norms brought to bear by engaging presumptions are reciprocal; as 
exhorters make visible their responsible efforts to act in principled ways, they communicatively make addressees 
accountable for seeing and likewise making responsible efforts to act in principled ways. Whereas an account of 
exhorting featuring “emotional contagion” would describe the potential efficacy of exhortation in terms of affect 
shared by speaker and addressees, a normative pragmatic account explains the potential efficacy in ethical, moral, 
and practical terms and, further, can explain why some highly emotionally-charged appeals can reasonably be 
expected to secure an intended response while others can be easily dismissed as foolish pretension. 
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4 Case study 
 Abraham Lincoln's 1860 speech at Cooper Union illustrates the explanatory power of a normative 
pragmatic theory of exhorting. The speech is a clear case of exhortation, and scholars concur that it is a literary and 
political masterpiece that helped to secure Lincoln’s nomination as Republican party candidate for United States 
President (Wilentz 2009) and perhaps made him president (Corry 2003; Holzer 2004). Our goal is not to provide an 
exhaustive interpretation of the speech but to test whether and to what extent normative pragmatic theory can 
explain why Lincoln’s exhortation secured a sympathetic hearing.  
Despite Lincoln’s conventional and politically astute disavowals as late as February 1860 in response to 
proposals that he run for president (Current 2009), his Cooper Union address is part of his campaign to be selected 
as the Republican nominee for United States President and then to defeat Democratic candidate Stephen Douglas in 
the national election. His immediate audience was the Young Men’s Central Republican Union, but Lincoln knew 
the speech would be printed in newspapers and reach a larger national audience (Holzer 2004). Lincoln concludes 
the speech by exhorting Republicans “to do our duty as we understand it” (1860, 284). He urges them to take a 
principled stand against the spread of slavery: "Wrong as we think slavery is, we can yet afford to let it alone where 
it is, because that much is due to the necessity arising from its actual presence in the nation" (1860, 283). Lincoln 
implies that electing him will enable Republicans to do their duty—that as long as votes by Republicans will prevent 
slavery from spreading, Republicans ought not “cast our votes with [Democrats’] view, and against our own” (1860, 
283). Lincoln describes Democratic candidate Douglas’ popular sovereignty position (inhabitants of territories ought 
to decide whether to join the union as a free or slave state) as a “don’t care” policy because calling for inhabitants of 
territories to decide on the status of slavery implies Douglas does not care how inhabitants vote (1860, 283). 
 Lincoln does not advocate abolition of slavery—immediate emancipation and full political, civil rights for 
free people—and could not seriously contend for national political office if he did because he would be dismissed as 
too radical. Lincoln had to exhort Republicans to stand against the spread of slavery in a way that enabled him to 
avoid charges that his rhetoric was incendiary. One of the main contenders for the Republican nomination, William 
Seward, was seen by some Republicans as not a viable choice because remarks he made in earlier speeches were 
considered to be too radical, making him vulnerable to criticism for inciting violence and disunion (Egerton 2010; 
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Leff and Mohrmann 1974). In short, Lincoln had to inspire Republicans to adhere to an anti-slavery position and not 
waver in their commitment to it—not vote instead for a candidate supporting a popular sovereignty position. 
 Lincoln's speech comprises three sections: a case against Douglas' position that the founding fathers are on 
the side of Democrats rather than Republicans (1860, 252-267), a direct address to the people of the South (1860, 
267-280), and a direct address to Republicans (1860, 280-284). In the third section he deliberately, openly exhorts 
Republicans: “let us stand by our duty, fearlessly and effectively” (1860, 283) and “LET US HAVE FAITH THAT 
RIGHT MAKES MIGHT, AND IN THAT FAITH, LET US, TO THE END, DARE TO DO OUR DUTY AS WE 
UNDERSTAND IT [all capitals in original]” (1860, 284). The third section is significantly shorter than the first two 
probably because in the first two sections he has already undertaken and discharged obligations connected with 
exhorting and vividly warranted a sympathetic hearing. The contours of his basic strategy for warranting a 
sympathetic hearing are apparent in the third section. He deploys argumentation to animate resentment for the 
rhetorical conduct of Douglas and the people of the South and reverence for the founding fathers in order to inspire 
Republicans to adhere to an anti-slavery position rather than waver in that commitment and vote for Douglas and 
popular sovereignty. 
Lincoln urges Republicans to “calmly consider” demands of the people of the South, but when he reasons 
about those demands he concludes the only way to satisfy them is to perform a morally questionable rhetorical 
action: “cease to call slavery wrong and join them in calling it right” (1860, 280, 281). He further urges 
Republicans, “Let us be diverted by none of those sophistical contrivances wherewith we are so industriously plied 
and belabored,” including Stephen Douglas’ advocacy of “a policy of ‘don’t care’ on a question about which all true 
men do care” as well as “Union appeals beseeching true Union men to yield to Disunionists, reversing the divine 
rule, and calling, not the sinners, but the righteous to repentance—[prolonged cheers and laughter,] such as 
invocations to Washington, imploring men to unsay what Washington said, and undo what Washington did” (1860, 
283). Thus Lincoln displays resentment for the rhetorical conduct of the people of the South and the Democratic 
candidate and reverence for founding father George Washington, and enacts preferable rhetorical conduct.  
In what follows we argue that the first two sections of the speech are designed to warrant a sympathetic 
hearing for his exhortation—to create reasons for Republicans to say they share Lincoln’s feelings about the 
situation and understand why he exhorts them to take a principled stand against the spread of slavery rather than 
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settle for a “don’t care” position. We show that Lincoln uses argumentation as a strategy for arousing 
intentional/affective orientations toward Douglas, founding fathers, and the people of the South. 
 
4.1 Inspiring by arguing against Douglas 
In the first section of the speech Lincoln considers the accuracy of Douglas’ claim that Democrats hold the 
same position as the founding fathers on the question of whether the federal government can control slavery in 
federal territories. Lincoln argues the founding fathers’ position is the opposite of what Douglas claims and 
meticulously makes the case by defining the issue and who the founding fathers are, and reporting how they voted 
on each occasion the issue was in question. Thus Lincoln begins to delineate the situation indicating the urgency for 
Republicans to do their duty to prevent the spread of slavery by making arguments. As critics of the speech have 
noted, Lincoln’s presentation of grounds, “while enmeshed in an incisive logical and linguistic structure,” is at the 
same time “fiercely emotional” (Leff and Mohrmann 1974, 351). But “emotional contagion” does not adequately 
account for how Lincoln’s argumentation is designed to work because belief and emotion are inextricably linked. 
We submit that Lincoln makes arguments to arouse an intentional/affective orientation—reverence for the founding 
fathers and resentment against Douglas—and inspire addressees to adhere to an anti-slavery position. 
The structure of Lincoln’s argumentation in this section of the speech is convergent. Lincoln first discusses 
six occasions when original framers of the United States Constitution acted on the question, and repeatedly 
concludes almost all indicated nothing forbade them from prohibiting slavery in federal territories (1860, 258; see 
also 254-55, 257, 259, 260). He then considers the positions of two other sets of framers: those who left no record on 
the direct question, and those in the first Congress. He concludes by repeating that “a clear majority of the whole—
certainly understood that no proper division of local from federal authority, nor any part of the Constitution, forbade 
the Federal Government to control slavery in the federal territories; while all the rest probably had the same 
understanding” (1860, 263). Finally, he considers whether amendments to the U.S. Constitution can serve as 
grounds for claiming federal control of slavery in federal territories is unconstitutional and concludes, based on the 
U.S. Congress passing an act enforcing prohibition of slavery in the Northwest Territory, Douglas’ claim to be on 
the side of the founding fathers is false. Further, Lincoln “def[ies] any man to show that any one of them [founding 
fathers] ever, in his whole life, declared that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal 
authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal 
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territories” (1860, 265). He repeats the conclusion again as he “def[ies] any one to show that any living man in the 
whole world ever did, prior to the beginning of the present century, (and I might almost say prior to the beginning of 
the last half of the present century,) declare that, in his understanding, any proper division of local from federal 
authority, or any part of the Constitution, forbade the Federal Government to control as to slavery in the federal 
territories” (1860, 265-66). How is Lincoln’s argumentation designed to inspire Republicans to adhere to an anti-
slavery position—to not waver in their commitment to that position by voting instead for Douglas and popular 
sovereignty? 
First, by using the presentational device of repeating the conclusion about how the founding fathers voted, 
Lincoln deliberately, openly intends to arouse reverence for the founding fathers. He openly undertakes and 
discharges an obligation to have ascertained the propriety of reverence by bringing to bear a norm that addressees 
ought not unthinkingly, blindly revere the founding fathers. In order to “guard a little against being misunderstood,” 
Lincoln explicitly states he does “not mean to say we are bound to follow implicitly in whatever our fathers did” but 
asserts that any supplanting of “the opinions and policy of our fathers in any case” should happen only “upon 
evidence so conclusive, and argument so clear, that even their great authority, fairly considered and weighed, cannot 
stand” (1860, 266). Thus Lincoln brings to bear a norm that reverence ought to be warranted and acts in accord with 
it, so communicatively creates conditions in which reverence for the founding fathers can legitimately ground 
inspired action. 
 Of course Lincoln’s claim that Republicans are on the side of the founding fathers is not without 
difficulties. The U.S. Constitution explicitly provided for the return of fugitive slaves, and some founding fathers 
were slaveholders. But Lincoln presents “Constitutional grounds for identification with the fathers, and he expands 
that association to the point that it offers stable moral ground for the party to repel attacks and to conceive its 
mission in principled, conservative terms” (Leff 2001, 238). In short, Lincoln can reasonably expect convergent 
argumentation, which repeats a conclusion about the founding fathers’ position on whether the federal government 
could control slavery in federal territories, to secure a sympathetic hearing. Deploying the strategy makes it difficult 
for Republicans to dismiss the exhortation with impunity by saying, for example, that Lincoln fails to understand 
and respect the principled action warranted by the founding fathers’ votes. Lincoln effectively adapts to his 
Republican audience in selecting the topic of reverence for the founding fathers. Republicans who want to claim 
reverence for the founding fathers as inspiration for their actions would need to at least grant a sympathetic hearing 
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to an exhortation urging them to act in accord with principles sanctioned by the founding fathers—would need to 
say they recognize and share Lincoln’s mindful reverence—or risk criticism for impiety or willful blindness to the 
founding fathers’ position. 
 Second, by increasing the intensity of his argumentation with each repetition, Lincoln deliberately, openly 
intends to arouse resentment against Douglas. One critic has described this section of the speech as a “rhetorical 
delight” and speculated that Lincoln likely altered the tone of the phrase with each repetition, “intoning it here with 
mock gravity, there with a sarcastic edge, and here again with a laugh of disbelief” (Holzer 2004, 121, 122). How is 
the presentational device of increasing intensity designed to inspire addressees to not waver from their Republican 
anti-slavery position and grant his exhortation a sympathetic hearing?  
 By repeating the point with increasing emotional intensity, Lincoln vividly, deliberately, openly displays 
grounds for resentment against Douglas but also restrained partisanship. In the scene Lincoln delineates, Douglas 
spectacularly fails to make good on a claim to be on the side of the founding fathers. Lincoln indirectly impugns 
Douglas’ rhetorical conduct as he concludes the first section of the speech by making determinate procedural, 
political norms of resolving conflict: if anybody “sincerely believes” that the federal government may not prohibit 
slavery in federal territories, “he is right to say so, and to enforce his position by all truthful evidence and fair 
argument which he can. But he has no right to mislead others, who have less access to history, and less leisure to 
study it, into the false belief,” by “substituting falsehood and deception for truthful evidence and fair argument” 
(1860, 266). Lincoln displays a “crying foul” strategy (Innocenti 2011) to warrant resentment against Douglas: he 
makes a key norm determinate; makes manifest the badness of Douglas’ rhetorical conduct; and shows that he is 
exercising forbearance—that Douglas can yet try to enforce his position by truthful evidence and fair argument. As a 
result Lincoln’s resentment culminates not in fury at a vicious liar or malevolent indifference to slavery but in 
ridicule for a fool who could yet make amends by using truthful evidence and fair argument. 
 Recall that Lincoln needs to exhort Republicans and avoid charges of inciting violence and disunion. A 
brief look at the well-known “Brutus is an honorable man” speech by Antony in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
enables us to make a comparative judgment about Lincoln’s strategy by considering how Lincoln could have 
manifested resentment against Douglas but did not (Jacobs 2000). In Act 3, Scene 2, Shakespeare’s Antony repeats 
“Brutus is an honorable man” in a scene of rendering “public reasons” for the murder of Caesar. The irony of 
Antony’s statement and the intensity of his resentment of Brutus for slaying Caesar increase with each iteration. 
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Antony’s use of a conditional—“if I were disposed to stir / Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage”—may be 
designed to enable him to plausibly deny an intention to incite violent retribution. But Antony’s exclamations and 
vivid description of the slaying of Caesar belie the conditional, and indeed Shakespeare’s citizens call for revenge, 
killing, slaying, burning.  
 While at first hearing Lincoln’s dramatic repetition may sound akin to Antony’s, significant differences 
between them bring into sharp relief the intentional/affective orientation Lincoln takes responsibility for holding and 
attempting to inspire in addressees while avoiding a charge of inciting violence and disunion. First, while the 
sentence Antony repeats is ironic—he says the opposite of what he means, and his true meaning is not immediately 
apparent—the sentence Lincoln repeats is a direct, literal conclusion based on historical research. Second, while 
Antony deploys exclamations and vivid descriptions of Caesar’s murder, Lincoln deploys argumentation; he 
carefully, deliberately, openly presents historical evidence and draws a conclusion that contradicts Douglas’ claim. 
Third, while Antony impugns Brutus by name—indeed, Brutus is the subject of the sentence he repeats—in this first 
section of the speech and after he begins presenting historical evidence, Lincoln refers to Douglas only twice: once 
by name and once indirectly. Of course “the fact that the ‘Little Giant’ is the object of the onslaught that ensues will 
be clear to everyone in the hall” (Holzer 2004, 121), but Lincoln deploys argumentation so can plausibly lay claim 
to restrained partisanship. And fourth, while Antony’s repetitions culminate in rage and desire for vengeance, 
Lincoln’s culminate in ridicule and a call for people who disagree with each other to play by the rules of debate. 
 In sum, Lincoln can reasonably expect convergent argumentation of increasing emotional intensity to 
secure a sympathetic hearing. With each repetition, Lincoln increases his vulnerability to criticism for mocking and 
insulting Douglas. On one hand, mocking and insulting are commonplace and conventional in a political campaign. 
But on the other hand, given the political situation, Lincoln needs to display moderation. So increasing the intensity 
of his case against Douglas involves conspicuously risking his claim to skilled advocacy and party leadership and 
thus creates more reason to grant his exhortation a sympathetic hearing. At the same time, Lincoln effectively adapts 
to his Republican audience in selecting the topic of resentment against Douglas. Deploying argumentation makes it 
difficult for Republicans to dismiss the exhortation with impunity by saying, for example, that Lincoln is just 
inciting or exacerbating partisan rancor, because they would risk criticism for not seeing the need for truthful 
evidence and fair argument in order to give positions and proceedings the political legitimacy necessary for 
 18 
preserving peace and maintaining the union of states. To avoid that criticism, they can grant a sympathetic hearing 
by saying, for example, that they recognize and share Lincoln’s resentment at Douglas’ rhetorical conduct. 
 
4.2 Inspiring by arguing against the people of the South 
 In the second section of the speech, Lincoln apostrophizes the people of the South. He directly addresses 
them as “if they would listen—as I suppose they will not” (1860, 267). We agree with scholars who hold that 
Lincoln is not in fact speaking directly to the people of the South in order to assuage slaveholders’ fears that a 
Republican, anti-slavery chief executive would abolish slavery. Instead he is continuing to exhort northerners and 
people in border states (Briggs 2005; Holzer 2004; Leff and Mohrmann 1974) to support a Republican anti-slavery 
position rather than a Democratic popular sovereignty one. We submit that Lincoln’s apostrophe is designed to 
arouse reverence for the founding fathers and resentment against the people of the South, and inspire them to adhere 
to the Republican anti-slavery position. Significantly, the main strategy Lincoln deploys as he apostrophizes is 
argumentation. 
Lincoln structures this second section as a response to accusations by the people of the South against 
Republicans: they are sectional, revolutionary, make the slavery question prominent, and cause insurrections. 
Lincoln’s broad strategies in this section are comparable to those in the first: he deploys argumentation to display 
grounds for his intentional/affective orientation. Lincoln’s strategy of directly addressing the people of the South 
makes it difficult for Republicans to plausibly claim Lincoln is haranguing them (Republicans) for wavering in their 
stance against slavery or accusing them of moral weakness, and to dismiss his exhortation as self-righteous or 
alienating. 
As he did with Douglas in the first section of the speech, in the second section Lincoln “cries foul” about 
the rhetorical conduct of the people of the South as part of his overt effort to inspire addressees to remain committed 
to an anti-slavery position. First, Lincoln makes norms of debate determinate and acts in accord with them. For 
example, at the outset of the section he states: “Bring forward your charges and specifications, and then be patient 
long enough to hear us deny or justify” (1860, 267). In addition, he makes determinate norms regarding burden of 
proof by stating, “You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you” 
(1860, 267). Making norms determinate and then living up to them continues to make manifest that Lincoln is 
playing by the rhetorical rules. 
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 Second, Lincoln deliberately, openly displays the badness of the rhetorical conduct of the people of the 
South. For example, according to Lincoln some people of the South “denounce [Republicans] as reptiles, or, at the 
best, as no better than outlaws” (1860, 267); “delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties 
given by Washington in his Farewell Address” (1860, 268); “reject, and scout, and spit upon that old policy” of the 
founding fathers which would ground their claims to conservatism (1860, 269); “need to be told that persisting in a 
charge which one does not know to be true, is simply malicious slander” (1860, 270); and threaten to “break up the 
Union . . . [with] a somewhat reckless sound” (1860, 274-75) akin to extortion (1860, 280). Lincoln’s delineation of 
bad rhetorical conduct displays grounds for his resentment. 
 Significantly, Lincoln delineates the situation such that the problem is not the South’s moral failure to 
recognize the humanity of Black people and inhumanity of slavery. Instead he faults the South for failing to act in 
accord with founding fathers who voted on the question of whether the federal government could control slavery in 
federal territories. For example, Lincoln reverses the charge of being revolutionary or destructive by calling on the 
people of the South to abide by principles of the founding fathers: “If you would have the peace of the old times, 
readopt the precepts and policy of the old times” (1860, 270). Likewise, Lincoln reverses the charge that 
Republicans make the slavery question more prominent than it formerly was by blaming the people of the South 
“who discarded the old policy of the fathers” (1860, 270). Responding to the charge that Republicans aided or 
encouraged John Brown’s raid at Harper’s Ferry, Lincoln replies that Republicans “hold to no doctrine, and make no 
declaration, which were not held to and made by ‘our fathers who framed the Government under which we live’” 
(1860, 271). When considering the position that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dred Scot decision supports the view of 
slaves as property, Lincoln notes that in contrast to the division of opinion and mistaken views of some U.S. 
Supreme Court justices, “‘our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live’—the men who made the 
Constitution—decided this same Constitutional question in our favor, long ago” (1860, 279) without division or 
factual mistakes. In fact, at the two points in the speech where Lincoln uses the word evil to describe slavery, he 
does so by attributing the moral stance to founding fathers (1860, 267, 273). Likewise, in this second section of the 
speech when he describes slavery as wrong, he associates the moral stance with the founding fathers: “True, we do, 
in common with ‘Our fathers, who framed the Government under which we live,’ declare our belief that slavery is 
wrong; but the slaves do not hear us declare even this” (1860, 271-72).  
 20 
If Lincoln had manifested resentment against the South’s immoral stance on slavery, then Republicans 
wavering in their commitment to an anti-slavery position could with impunity dismiss his exhortation on the 
grounds that they cannot share the intensity of a feeling that will threaten violence and disunion. Responding to 
accusations with “truthful evidence and fair argument” is the norm of argumentation and debate that Lincoln openly, 
deliberately brings to bear in the situation, and failures of the people of the South to live up to that norm ground 
feelings of resentment. Republicans cannot with impunity deny a sympathetic hearing to Lincoln’s exhortation by 
saying they do not share his resentment about the South’s rhetorical conduct, because saying so would put them at 
risk of criticism for condoning misconduct that threatens procedures established by the founding fathers for 
addressing political conflict and thus the integrity of the U.S. government. 
 Third, Lincoln displays that he exercises forbearance—that he is giving the people of the South a chance to 
adjust their tactics and respond appropriately with truthful evidence and fair argument and giving the political 
system established by the founding fathers a chance to work as it should. Lincoln displays forbearance at the outset 
of the apostrophe to the people of the South, thus making it conspicuous, open, and deliberate. We quote at length 
because the passage shows how Lincoln brings together features of a “crying foul” strategy we have separated 
analytically: making norms determinate, making manifest the badness of the South’s rhetorical conduct, and 
showing he exercises forbearance. Lincoln first considers the charge that the Republican party is sectional. He 
explains that the people of the South “ought to have started” with “a discussion of the right or wrong of our 
principle” (1860, 268): 
If our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section for the benefit of ours, or for any other object, 
then our principle, and we with it, are sectional, and are justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us, 
then, on the question of whether our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section; and so meet it as 
if it were possible that something may be said on our side. Do you accept the challenge? No! Then you 
really believe that the principle which ‘our fathers who framed the Government under which we live’ 
thought so clearly right as to adopt it, and indorse it again and again, upon their official oaths, is in fact so 
clearly wrong as to demand your condemnation without a moment’s consideration. (1860, 268) 
First, Lincoln makes norms of debate and argumentation determinate as he defines the issue and calls on the people 
of the south to address it. Second, he displays the badness of the South’s rhetorical conduct as they condemn the 
founding fathers’ principle “without a moment’s consideration.” Thus Lincoln displays grounds for resentment 
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about the South’s rhetorical conduct and reverence for the founding fathers. The principle he takes responsibility for 
living up to is the founding father’s position on whether the federal government can control slavery in the territories, 
and makes the topic not the injustice of slavery but whether the principle of antislavery “would wrong your section.” 
Third, he shows he is exercising forbearance as he asks the people of the South to respond to his challenge even 
though he suggests he does not think it is possible for them to say something that would support a claim that the 
anti-slavery position harms the South. By exercising forbearance Lincoln displays a commitment to political, 
institutional procedures for resolving conflict. He displays that commitment even more vividly as he asks whether 
“the number of John Browns [would] be lessened or enlarged” by “forcing the sentiment” against slavery “out of the 
peaceful channel of the ballot-box, into some other channel” (1860, 274), namely military action.  
 Thus Lincoln delineates a situation where Republicans can occupy the political high ground with the 
founding fathers primarily by arguing well and voting. Lincoln can reasonably expect the apostrophe to the people 
of the South to secure a sympathetic hearing from Republicans. First, by undertaking and discharging obligations to 
argue truthfully, fairly, and appropriately, Lincoln licenses Republicans to presume Lincoln would not risk criticism 
for questionable morality or incendiary conduct unless he had responsibly ascertained the principled action called 
for in the circumstances. Second, in order to avoid criticism for questionable morality and condoning rhetorical 
conduct that would lead to violence and disunion, Republicans can grant Lincoln’s exhortation a sympathetic 




 The normative structure of exhorting helps to account for the design of Lincoln’s Cooper Union address. 
Lincoln makes statements openly urging and intending to inspire Republicans to adhere to an anti-slavery position, 
and intending that Republicans’ recognition of those intentions creates reasons for them to grant his exhortation a 
sympathetic hearing. In this case externalization of a sympathetic hearing comprises statements semantically 
equivalent to recognizing and sharing Lincoln’s resentment of the bad rhetorical conduct of Douglas and the people 
of the South, namely their failure to use truthful evidence and fair argument, and his mindful reverence of the 
founding fathers’ position on the issue of whether the federal government could control slavery in federal territories. 
Lincoln warrants his feelings of resentment and reverence by arguing. Thus, our analysis indicates that as in 
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proposing and accusing (Kauffeld 1998), so in exhorting arguing is a strategy that may be deployed in the service of 
a master speech act. Lincoln deploys argumentation to communicatively create conditions for the effective reception 
of his exhortation (cf. Jacobs 2006). We have not provided an exhaustive account of rhetorical strategies Lincoln 
deploys to influence Republicans, but we have shown the normative structure of exhorting accounts for the practical 
efficacy of Lincoln’s speech. 
 We can imagine exhorters deploying strategic maneuvers other than argumentation to inspire principled 
action, such as telling stories. But in the case of Lincoln’s Cooper Union address, a relevant, central moral sentiment 
is resentment about bad rhetorical conduct. Lincoln can reasonably expect the topic of resentment about bad 
rhetorical conduct presented in the form of arguing to influence Republicans who want to lay claim to trying to 
preserve peace and union, because arguing communicatively creates reasons for them to do so. First, the maneuver 
licenses Republicans to presume he would not risk criticism for displaying questionable moral judgment, inciting 
violence, alienating addressees, and the like unless he had made responsible efforts to ascertain the urgent need for 
principled action and to understand Republicans’ difficulties in performing it. Second, Republicans can say they see 
and share Lincoln’s resentment about bad rhetorical conduct in order to avoid criticism for questionable judgment 
and failing to recognize and participate in the very procedures—argumentation and debate—that constitute and give 
legitimacy to decisions made by governments based on the consent of the governed, that is, the form of government 
established by the founding fathers. Lincoln counts on the strategy of argumentation to bring to bear the norm that 
“power has to persuade in a reasonable way” (Ieţcu-Fairclough 2009, 132), that is, political conflict in a 
representative democracy ought to be managed by participating in political procedures involving argumentation and 
debate. Failure to do so undermines government itself. 
 We submit that a normative pragmatic account of exhorting is preferable to an account featuring 
“emotional contagion” because it explains why social actors can reasonably expect their utterances to influence 
other social actors. If emotional contagion were the key mechanism, then we would expect to see exhorters routinely 
designing messages displaying affect only or primarily. But a quick perusal of civic speech illustrates that social 
actors routinely do more, fundamentally including presenting grounds for affect and, in doing so, undertaking ethical 
and moral obligations. A normative pragmatic account of exhorting can capture the range of communication 
resources that social actors bring to bear to influence other social actors, so can capture the complexity of human 
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